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Abstract. We introduce an abstract domain for information-ﬂow anal-
ysis of software. The proposal combines variable dependency analysis
with numerical abstractions, yielding to accuracy and eﬃciency improve-
ments. We apply the full power of the proposal to the case of database
query languages as well. Finally, we present an implementation of the
analysis, called Sails, as an instance of a generic static analyzer. Keeping
the modular construction of the analysis, the tool allows one to tune the
granularity of heap analysis and to choose the numerical domain involved
in the reduced product. This way the user can tune the information leak-
age analysis at diﬀerent levels of precision and eﬃciency. AQ1
1 Introduction
Protecting the conﬁdentiality is a relevant problem when sensitive information
ﬂows through computing systems or transmits over public networks. Standard
protection mechanisms, such as encryption, access control, etc. can suitably be
applied at source level, but they are unable to protect the conﬁdentiality once
the information is released from the source and is allowed to ﬂow through the
computing systems.
The starting point of secure information ﬂow analysis in software applications
is the classiﬁcation of program variables into diﬀerent security levels. In the
simplest case, two levels are commonly used: public (or low, L) and secret (or
high, H). The main purpose is to prevent the leakage of sensitive information
when ﬂowing (implicitly or explicitly) from a high variable h to a lower one l.
An explicit ﬂow from h to l occurs when the content of h directly aﬀects (e.g.,
through an assignment operator) l. On the other hand, an implicit ﬂow from h
to l occurs when the content of l gets aﬀected indirectly (e.g., through a boolean
condition in an if statement) by h, as stated in [17].
There is a widespread literature onmethods and techniques for checking secure
information ﬂows in software. Generally, works on information ﬂow fall into two
categories: (i) dynamic, instrumentation based approaches (e.g., tainting), and (ii)
static, language-based approaches (e.g., type systems). The dynamic approaches
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introduce signiﬁcant run-time overhead [10,33]. The static approaches typically
require some changes to the language and the run-time environment as well as non-
trivial type annotations [38], making their adoption too expensive in practice.
Nevertheless, despite of these deep and extensive works, their practical appli-
cations have been relatively poor. Usually these approaches work on an ad-hoc
programming language [4], and they do not support mainstream languages. This
means that one should completely rewrite a program in order to apply them to
some existing code.
Recently a new generic static analyzer (Sample1) based on the Abstract Inter-
pretation theory has been developed and applied to many diﬀerent contexts and
analysis. Roughly, this analyzer splits and combines the abstraction of the heap
and the approximation of other semantic information, e.g. string [12], type [19]
abstractions.
In this paper2, we introduce a language-based information-ﬂow analysis of
imperative and database query languages based on the Abstract Interpretation
framework, by combining symbolic and numerical domains; we present the tool
Sails (Static Analysis of Information Leakage with Sample); ﬁnally, we show
experimental results applying Sails on security benchmark programs.
In particular,
1. we represent variables’ dependences in the form of propositional formula ψ =
x → y, where x, y are variables and value of y possibly depend on the value of
x; in order to detect possible information leakage, we check the satisﬁability of
ψ when assigning each variable the truth value corresponding to its sensitivity
level;
2. we deﬁne abstract semantics of (i) imperative and (ii) database query lan-
guages in the domain of propositional formulae, by considering an over-
approximation of variables’ dependences at each program point;
3. we enhance the accuracy of the technique by analysing programs over numer-
ical abstract domains, using reduced product of the symbolic propositional
formulae domain and numerical abstract domains;
4. ﬁnally, we show encouraging experimental results on a set of security bench-
marks using the tool Sails which is implemented based on our proposal.
The overall analysis combines a symbolic variable dependency analysis, based
on the propositional formulae domain [11], and a variable value dependency
analysis using numerical abstractions (e.g., intervals or polyhedra). Unlike other
works, our proposal provides an information ﬂow analysis without any major
constraint on the target language, since it tracks information ﬂows between vari-
ables and heap locations over programs written in mainstream object-oriented
languages like Java and Scala.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the depen-
dency analysis through the propositional formulae domain. Section 3 combines
the dependency analysis with numerical domains through a reduced product.
1 http://www.pm.inf.ethz.ch/research/semper/Sample.
2 The paper is a revised and extended version of [25,47,48].
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An extension to the case of database query languages is discussed in Sect. 4.
Section 5 presents the main issues we solved in order to plug this information ﬂow
analysis into Sample while developing Sails. Section 6 presents the experimental
results when applying Sails to a complex case study and to the SecuriBench-
micro suite. Finally, Sect. 7 presents the related work and Sect. 8 concludes.
2 Dependency Analysis
This section formalizes the dependency analysis and proves its soundness follow-
ing the abstract interpretation framework.
2.1 The Language
For the sake of simplicity, we consider a simple imperative language where pro-
grams consist of labeled commands (similar to [26]). The syntax is deﬁned in
Table 13.
Table 1. Syntax of the language
3 In the rest of the paper, we will omit the initial and ﬁnal labels of statements when
not required.
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Table 2. Initial label function
Table 3. Final label function
Table 4. Action function
Let in : C → L and fin : C → L be two functions. By in[[c]] and fin[[c]] we
denote the initial and final label of command c ∈ C respectively. These two
functions are formally deﬁned in Tables 2 and 3.
Each command corresponds to one or more actions. The set of actions,
denoted by A, consists of {skip, v := exp, b, ¬b, endif, done}. Let a : C →
℘(A) be a function that, given a command, returns the set of actions involved
in it. The function a for various commands is deﬁned in Table 4.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the variables appearing in a pro-
gram are implicitly declared. We denote by V(P) the set of variables in program
P and, similarly, by V(exp) and V(b) the variables contained in expression exp
and condition b respectively. The deﬁnition of V is reported in Table 5.
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Table 5. Variables functions
Table 6. Evaluation of expressions
Table 7. Evaluation of boolean conditions
2.2 The Concrete Domain
An environment ρ ∈ E is a function ρ : V → N which assigns a value to each
variable. A state σ ∈ Σ = (L × E) is a pair 〈, ρ〉 where the program label  is
the label of the action to be executed and the environment ρ deﬁnes the values
of program variables at .
We denote by E[[exp]]σ and B[[b]]σ the evaluation of expression exp ∈ E and
condition b ∈ B respectively on the state σ. The details can be found in Tables 6
and 7 respectively.
Given a program P, the set of possible initial and ﬁnal states are deﬁned as
I[[P]] ≡ {〈in[[P]], ρ〉 | ρ ∈ E} and F[[P]] ≡ {〈fin[[P]], ρ〉 | ρ ∈ E}.
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Table 8. The transition function
The labeled transition semantics T[[c]] of a command c ∈ P is a set of
transitions 〈σ1, a, σ2〉 between a state σ1 and its next states σ2 by an action
a ∈ a(c). The triple 〈σ1, a, σ2〉 is also denoted by σ1 a−→ σ2. The transition func-
tion T : C → ℘(Σ × A × Σ) in Table 8 tracks all reachable states.
A labeled transition system is a tuple 〈Σ, I,F,A,T〉, where Σ is the set of
states, I ⊆ Σ is a nonempty set of initial states, F ⊆ Σ is a set of ﬁnal states,
A is a nonempty set of actions, and T ∈ ℘(Σ × A × Σ) is the labeled transition
relation.
We deﬁne the partial trace semantics of a transition system, similarly to [26],
as the set of all possible traces of elements in Σ (denoted by Σ), recording the
observation of executions starting from initial states and possibly reaching ﬁnal
states in ﬁnite time.
Σ ∈ ℘(Σ × A × Σ)
Σ = {σ0 a0−→ . . . an−1−−−→ σn | n ≥ 1 ∧ σ0 ∈ I ∧ ∀i ∈ [0, n − 1] : σi ai−→ σi+1 ∈ T }
Let π0, π1 ∈ Σ be two partial traces. We deﬁne the following lattice operators:
– π0  π1 if and only if π0 is a subtrace of π1,
– π0 uprise π1 = π such that (π  π1) ∧ (π  π2) and (∀π′ : (π′  π1) ∧ (π′ 
π2)).π′  π.
Σ equipped with the order relation “” and the meet operator “uprise”, forms the
meet semi lattice 〈Σ,,uprise〉.
This partial trace semantics can be expressed in a ﬁxpoint form as well.
Σ = lfp⊆F :
F ∈ Σ → Σ
F (X) def= {σ a
′
−→ σ′ ∈ T | σ ∈ I}∪
{σ0 a0−→ . . . an−2−−−→ σn−1 an−1−−−→ σn | σ0 a0−→ . . . an−2−−−→ σn−1 ∈X∧σn−1 an−1−−−→ σn ∈T}
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Let 〈℘(Σ),⊆, ∅, Σ,∩,∪〉 be a complete lattice of partial execution traces, where
“⊆” is the classical subset relation, “∪” is the set union and “∩” the set inter-
section.
2.3 Abstract Domain: Pos
Among all the abstract domains which are used in abstract interpretation of
logic programs, Pos has received considerable attention [2,11]. This domain is
most commonly applied to the analysis of groundness dependencies for logic
programs.
Let V = {x, y, z, · · · } be a countably inﬁnite set of propositional variables and
let FP(V) be the set of all ﬁnite subsets of variables of V. The set of propositional
formulae containing variables in V and logical connectives in Γ ⊆ {∧,∨,→,¬} is
denoted by Ω(Γ ). Similarly, given U ∈ FP(V), the set of propositional formulae
containing variables in U and connectives in Γ is denoted by ΩU(Γ ).
A truth-assignment is a function Υ : V → {T, F} that assigns to each propo-
sitional variable the value true (T) or false (F). Given a formula f ∈ Ω(Γ ), Υ  f
means that Υ satisﬁes f, and f1  f2 is a shorthand for “Υ  f1 implies Υ  f2”.
Ω(Γ ) is ordered by f1  f2 ⇔ f1  f2. Two formulae f1 and f2 are logically
equivalent, denoted f1 ≡ f2 iﬀ f1  f2 and f2  f1.
The unit assignment u is deﬁned by u(x) = T for all x ∈ V. We deﬁne the set
of positive formulae by Pos = {f ∈ Ω(Γ ) | u  f}. Some obvious examples are
T, x1 ∈ Pos and F,¬x1 /∈ Pos.
We can consider the propositional formula ψ as a conjunction of subfor-
mulae (ζ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ζn). We denote the set of subformulae of ψ as Subψ. Let
 be the least upper bound operator on propositional formula deﬁned by
{ψ0, . . . , ψn} =
∧{Subψ0 , . . . ,Subψn}. (Pos,,) forms a join semi lattice.
Moreover, let  : Pos × Pos → Pos be a binary operator deﬁned as “simpliﬁ-
cation” between two propositional formulae: ψ0  ψ1 =
∧
(Subψ0 \ Subψ1 ). This
“simpliﬁcation” permits us to obtain all the implication in ψ0 which are not
contained in ψ1.
2.4 Abstract Semantics
Our approach is based on the abstract domain of logic formulae representing
dependency between variables (which tracks the propagation of sensitive/insen-
sitive information). The detection of possible information leakages is performed
by evaluating formulae on truth-assignment functions. In particular, the analysis
involves the following steps:
– Constructs at each program point the propositional formula ψ through a ﬁx-
point algorithm which represents an over-approximation of variable’s depen-
dencies up to that program point.
– Partitions the variables into public and private privacy levels. Apply a truth-
assignment function Υ that assigns to each propositional variable the value T
(true) or the value F (false) if the corresponding variable is private or public,
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respectively. If Υ does not satisfy ψ at all program points, then there could
be some information leakages.
The logic formulae, obtained from program’s instructions, are in the form:
∧
0≤i≤n 0≤j≤m
{xi → yj}
which means that the values of variable yj could depend on the values of
variable xi. For instance, the formula y → x represents variable dependency
in assignment statement x := y; similarly, in case of conditional statement
if(x == 0) then y := z we obtain the formula (x → y) ∧ (z → y). Notice that
the propositional variable v corresponds to the program variable v.
Formally, an abstract state σ ∈ Σ def= L× Pos is a pair 〈, φ〉 where φ ∈ Pos
represents the dependencies occurred among program variables up to label  ∈ L.
Given a pair σ = 〈, φ〉, we deﬁne l(σ) =  and r(σ) = φ. Let BV (c), deﬁned
in Table 9, be the set of bound variables in command c.
Table 9. BV function
Table 10. Abstract semantics
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The abstract semantics of a command c is deﬁned by T[[c]]. Similar to the
concrete domain, we denote the transition from σ1 to σ

2 by σ

1 → σ2. The
abstract semantics in the domain of propositional formulae is deﬁned in Table 10.
Consider two sets of abstract states S1 and S2 such that S1 = {〈10, ψ10〉, . . .,
〈1n, ψ1n〉} and S2 = {〈20, ψ20〉, . . ., 〈2m, ψ2m〉}. The partial ordering is deﬁned by
S1  S2 ⇔ n ≤ m|∀i ∈ [0, n], 1i = 2i ∧ ∀i ∈ [0, n], ψ1i  ψ2i . Let S0, . . . Sn ∈
℘(Σ) be sets of abstract states. 〈℘(Σ),〉 forms a poset since it is reﬂexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive by basic properties of logic implication. The join
operator unionsq is deﬁned by:
unionsq{S0, . . . ,Sn} =
⋃
(S0, . . . ,Sn)
∪ {〈, ψ〉 | ψ = {ψ′ | 〈, ψ′〉 ∈
⋃
(S0, . . . ,Sn)}}
\ {〈, ψ〉 ∈
⋃
(S0, . . . ,Sn) | ∃〈, ψ′〉 ∈
⋃
(S0, . . . ,Sn) ∧ ψ = ψ′}
and the meet operator  by:
{S0, . . . ,Sn} ={〈, ψ〉 ∈ S′ | S′ ∈ {S0, . . . ,Sn}∧
∀i ∈ [0, n].∃〈, ψ′i〉 ∈ Si ∧ ψ  ψ′i}
Basically, the join operator consists in the union of all elements. When two
elements have the same label but diﬀerent formula, the join operator takes the
biggest one. Instead, the meet operator considers only the abstract states, with
the same label, which are in all elements. In case of diﬀerent formulae, the
meet operator takes the smallest one. By deﬁnition join and meet operator are
deﬁned for every subset of elements of our domain. Therefore, we can conclude
that 〈℘(Σ),, ∅, Σ,unionsq,〉 forms a complete lattice.
Let I[[P]] = {〈in[[P]], T〉} be the set of possible initial abstract state of pro-
gram P. We deﬁne the abstract semantics as the set of all ﬁnite sets of abstract
states, denoted by Σ, reachable during one or more executions, in a ﬁnite time.
For each element S ∈ Σ we can denote by S the set of terminal states, deﬁned
as S = {σ0 | σ1 ∈ S.σ0 → σ1 ∈ T} and by (S) all labels of S. Let Sσ0,σn
denote a set of states, called abstract sequence, that contains a starting state σ0
and an ending state σn such that contains one or more traces from σ

0 to σ

n. We
have that S
σ0 ,σ

n
= {σn}.
We express the abstract semantics in a ﬁxpoint form.
Σ =lfpF  where F  ∈ Σ → Σ
F (X) def={σ | σ ∈ I} ∪ {Sσ0,σn | n ≥ 1 ∧ σ

0 ∈ I ∧ Sσ0,σn−1 ∈ X
∧ σn−1 → σn ∈ T} ∪ {unionsq{Sσ0,σn | Sσ0,σn ∈ X}}
Example 1. In order to better understand how our dependency analysis works,
consider the code in Fig. 1 and the program points 4, 5, 8, 10, 12 and 14. When we
apply the steps deﬁned above we obtain the propositional formulae in Table 11.
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Table 11. Results of the analysis by Pos domain
Label Propositional formula
4 x → y
5 p → sum
8 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (y → sum)
10 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (x → sum)
12 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (x → sum) ∧ (y → sum)
14 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (x → sum) ∧ (y → sum) ∧ (n → sum)∧
(i → sum) ∧ (i → n) ∧ (k → sum) ∧ (k → n)
Through our analysis we tracked all the relation between variables. Suppose that
variables {x, p} are private, while all other variables are public. Formally, the
correspondent truth-assignment function is deﬁned by Υ = {x, p → T} ∪ {v →
F : v ∈ V \ {x, p}}. Υ does not satisfy the propositional formulae since in all
considered program points there are some public variables that depends on one
or more private variables.
Notice that we detect several spurious relations, too. For instance, in contrast
with the obtained result, the variable sum does not depend on n. Indeed at the
end of the both branches the variable sum has always the same value. In Sect. 3
we will reﬁne the results through the domains combination.
2.5 An Instrumented Concrete Domain
To simplify the proof that our concrete and abstract domains from a Galois
connection, we introduce another domain, isomorphic to the concrete domain.
Let σ ∈ Σ = L × A be the set of states of this intermediate domain. A pair
〈, a〉 ∈ L×A represents an action a which occurs at program label . Consider the
set Σ which contains all the possible traces of σ that can occur during a ﬁnite
computation. Given Π0 ,Π

1 ∈ ℘(Σ), we deﬁne that Π0 ⊆ Π1 if and only if for
each π0 ∈ Π0 there exists a π1 ∈ Π1 such that π0  π1 . We have that π0  π1
if and only if π0 is a subsequence of π

1 . Therefore 〈℘(Σ),⊆, ∅, Σ,∩,∪〉 forms
a lattice. Moreover, we denote by π the last state of the sequence.
We can relate ℘(Σ) and ℘(Σ) by an abstraction α ∈ ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) and
a concretization γ ∈ ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) function.
Let X = {π0, . . . , πn} ∈ ℘(Σ) be a set of partial traces and let Y =
{π0 , . . . , πn} ∈ ℘(Σ) be a set of sequences of σ.
α(X) ≡{〈0, a0〉 → . . . → 〈m, am〉 | σ0
0a0−−−→ . . .
mam−−−−→ σm+1 ∈ X}
γ(Y) ≡{π ∈ ℘(Σ) | α({π}) ⊆ Y}
Lemma 1. ℘(Σ) −−−→−←−−−−
α
γ
℘(Σ) forms an isomorphism, that is, γ ◦ α =
α ◦ γ = id (where id is the identity function).
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Proof. We have to prove that γ ◦ α = α ◦ γ = id , where id is the identity
function. Let X and Y be elements of ℘(Σ) and ℘(Σ) respectively.
α(γ(X)) = {〈0, a0〉 → . . . → 〈m, am〉 | σ0
0 a0−−−→ . . .
m am−−−−→ σm+1 ∈ γ(X)}
by deﬁnition of α
= {〈0, a0〉 → . . . → 〈m, am〉 | σ0
0 a0−−−→ . . .
m am−−−−→ σm+1
∈ {π | α({π}) ⊆ X}}by deﬁnition of γ
= {〈0, a0〉 → . . . → 〈m, am〉 | 〈0, a0〉 → . . . → 〈m, am〉 ∈ X}
= X
γ(α(Y)) = {π ∈ ℘(Σ) | α({π}) ⊆ α(Y)}
by deﬁnition of γ
= {π ∈ ℘(Σ) | α({π}) ⊆ {α({π′}) | π′ ∈ Y}}
by deﬁnition of α
= {π ∈ ℘(Σ) | π ∈ Y}
= Y
unionsq
Now we deﬁne the relation between ℘(Σ) and ℘(Σ) by α and γ. α :
℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) is deﬁned by α(X) = unionsq{θ(π) | π ∈ X}, where θ : Σ →
℘(Σ) is deﬁned as follows.
θ(X) ={〈, ψ〉 | ∀π ∈ X.∀π′ = 〈0, a0〉 → 〈m, am〉  π :
m ≥ 0 ∧  = m ∧ ψ = f0 ∧ . . . ∧ fn}
such that:
1. (∀〈, v := exp〉 ∈ π′ : ∀〈′, v := exp′〉 ∈ π′.′ ≤ ).∃fi = y → v : y ∈ V(exp)
2. ∀((〈i, b〉 → . . . → 〈j , endif〉) ∨ (〈i, not b〉 → . . . → 〈j , endif〉))  π which
represents an if statement and ∀〈k, v := expk〉 : i < k < j exists fh = y → v
such that y ∈ V(b).
3. ∀((〈i, b〉 → . . . → 〈j , done〉) ∨ (〈i, not b〉 → . . . → 〈j , done〉))  π which
represents a while statement and ∀〈k, v := expk〉 : i < k < j exists fh = y → v
such that y ∈ V(b).
Intuitively, the function θ transforms each action (or sequence of actions) in one
or more propositional formulae. The easiest (case 1) applies when the action is
an assignment statement (v := exp): we simply obtain the corresponding formula
as deﬁned in the transition semantics T. Instead, for if statements (case 2), we
track all the assignment actions that are between if and endif. while statements
are treated in a similar way (case 3).
Notice that 〈i, b〉 → . . . → 〈j , endif〉 (or 〈i, not b〉 → . . . → 〈j , endif〉)
represents an if statement if and only if ∀(〈p, b〉 ∨ 〈p, not b〉) : i < p <
j.∃(〈q, endif〉 ∨ 〈q, done〉) : p < q < j and ∀(〈q, endif〉 ∨ 〈q, done〉) : i < q <
j.∃(〈p, b〉 ∨ 〈p, not b〉) : i < p < q. Similarly for while statement.
Informally, the pair if and endif (or while and done) is an if (while) statement
if and only if between these two actions, there are only assignments or other pairs
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if-endif or while-done which correspond to nested if and while statements. To bet-
ter understand, consider the sequence · · · 〈0, b0〉 → 〈1, b1〉 → 〈2, v := exp〉 →
〈3, endif〉 · · · : the pairs 〈0, b0〉 and 〈3, endif〉 are not an if statement because
between these two actions there is 〈1, b1〉, which does not represent an assign-
ment action neither an if statement.
The concretization function γ : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) is deﬁned by γ(Y) =
{π ∈ Σ | θ(π)  Y ∧ l(π) ∈ (Y)} where Y ∈ ℘(Σ).
Lemma 2. θ : Σ → ℘(Σ) is monotonic: x  y ⇒ θ(x)  θ(y)
Proof. Let x0 = {σ0 → . . . → σn} and x1 = {σ′0 → . . . → σ′m} be two elements
of Σ such that x0  x1 and consider θ(x0) = {σ0, . . . , σn} and θ(x1) =
{σ′0, . . . , σ′m}.
By the deﬁnition of “” we know that n ≤ m, ∀i ∈ [0, n].σi = σ′i. Therefore,
by the deﬁnition of θ, we have that ∀i ∈ [0, n].σi = σ′i. Then, by deﬁnition of
“”, θ(x0)  θ(x1). unionsq
Lemma 3. α : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) is monotonic: X ⊆ Y ⇒ α(X)  α(Y)
Proof. Consider X0,X1 ∈ ℘(Σ) such that X0 ⊆ X1, α(X0) = unionsq{θ(π) | π ∈
X0} and α(X1) = unionsq{θ(π) | π ∈ X1}. By deﬁnition of “⊆”, ∀π ∈ X0,∃π ∈
X1. By Lemma 2, θ(π0)  θ(π1) for all π0 ∈ X0 and π1 ∈ X1. Then we have
α(X0)  α(X1): α(X1) contains all the elements in α(X0). unionsq
Lemma 4. γ : ℘(Σ) → ℘(Σ) is monotonic: X  Y ⇒ γ(X) ⊆ γ(Y)
Proof. Consider X0,X1 ∈ ℘(Σ) such that X0  X1, γ(X0) = {π ∈ ℘(Σ) |
θ(π)  X0 ∧ l(π) ∈ (X0 )} and γ(X1) = {π ∈ ℘(Σ) | θ(π)  X1 ∧
l(π) ∈ (X1 )}. By deﬁnition of “” and by Lemma 2, for all π0 ∈ γ(X0) exists
π1 ∈ γ(X1). Therefore γ(X0)  γ(X1). unionsq
Lemma 5. α ◦ γ is the identity: α(γ(X)) = X
Proof. Let X be an element of ℘(Σ). By deﬁnition of α, α(γ(X)) = unionsq{θ(π) |
π ∈ γ(X)}. By deﬁnition of γ, α(γ(X)) = unionsq{θ(π) | θ(π)  X ∧ l(π) ∈
(X)}. Then, α(γ(X)) contains the least upper bound of all the abstract traces
that have the same last label of X and that are less or equal than X. Therefore
α(γ(X)) = X. unionsq
Lemma 6. γ ◦ α is extensive: X  γ(α(X))
Proof. Consider X ∈ ℘(Σ). By deﬁnition of γ, γ(α(X)) = {π ∈ ℘(Σ) |
θ(π)  α(X) ∧ l(π) ∈ (α(X))}. By deﬁnition of α, γ(α(X)) = {π ∈
℘(Σ) | θ(π)  unionsq{θ(π) | π ∈ X} ∧ l(π) ∈ (α(X))}. By deﬁnition of
“unionsq”, “” and by Lemma 2, X  γ(α(X)). unionsq
Lemma 7. ℘(Σ) −−−→−←−−−−
α
γ
℘(Σ) is a Galois insertion.
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Proof. ℘(Σ) and ℘(Σ) are two complete lattices, γ and α are monotonic
(Lemmas 3 and 4), α ◦ γ is the identity (Lemma 5) and γ ◦ α is extensive
(Lemma 6). Therefore ℘(Σ) −−−→−←−−−−
α
γ
℘(Σ) is a Galois insertion. unionsq
Finally, we can express the relation between ℘(Σ) and ℘(Σ) by the com-
position of above functions, α = α ◦ α and γ = γ ◦ γ.
Since the composition of an isomorphism and a Galois insertion is a Galois
insertion, we can assert that ℘(Σ) −−−→−←−−−−
γ
α
℘(Σ) is a Galois insertion.
2.6 Properties
The aim of information ﬂow analysis is to verify the conﬁdentiality and the
integrity of the information in computer programs. An information ﬂow analysis
can be carried out by considering diﬀerent attacker abilities. In this context we
consider two diﬀerent scenarios: when the attacker can read public variables only
at the beginning and at the end of the computation, and when the attacker can
read public variables after each step of the computation. Note that the attacker,
in both cases, knows the source code of the program.
Both the properties and the types of attacker are checked through the def-
inition and the satisﬁability of the propositional formulae (Pos) with respect
to the truth-assignment function. Let ΥP : V → {T, F} be a truth-assignment
function associated with the program P. The security properties are modeled
by the function deﬁnition, while the attacker is modeled by the set of propo-
sitional formulae we consider for the satisﬁability. For the ﬁrst case, in which
the attacker can read public variables only at the beginning and at the end of
the computation, the set of states to consider involves only the terminal states
of each sequence ({S ∈ Σ | ΥP  r(S)}). Whereas in the second case, when
the attacker can read public variables at each step of the computation, the
set of states to consider involves all the propositional formulae in the sequence
({S ∈ Σ | ∀σ ∈ S : ΥP  r(σ)}).
Confidentiality. Conﬁdentiality refers to limiting information access and dis-
closure to authorized users. For example, we require when we buy something
online that our private data (e.g., credit card number) can be read only by the
merchant.
Let ΥP : V → {L,H} be a function which assigns to each variable of program
P a security class. P respects the conﬁdentiality property, if and only if it does
not contain any information leakage with respect to the function ΥP, i.e., there
is no information that moves from private to public variables. To verify this
property, we deﬁne the corresponding truth-assignment function ΥP as follows.
ΥP(x) =
{
T if ΥP(x) = H
F if ΥP(x) = L
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Integrity. By integrity we mean that unauthorized people cannot modify a
message.
Let ΥP : V → {L,H} be a function which assigns to each variable of program
P a security class. The integrity property is veriﬁed if and only if public variables
do not modify private variables, i.e., there is no information leakage from public
variables to private variables. The corresponding truth-assignment function ΥP ,
to check this property, is deﬁned as follows.
ΥP(x) =
{
T if ΥP(x) = L
F if ΥP(x) = H
Notice that it is exactly the opposite of the truth-assignment function for the
conﬁdentiality property.
3 Combination of Symbolic and Numerical Domains
In this Section, we combine the symbolic propositional formulae domain
described above with a numerical domain through reduced product, yielding
to a reﬁnement of the results obtained by the dependency analysis. Our modu-
lar construction allows to tune eﬃciency and accuracy changing the numerical
domain. For instance, if we use intervals, we will be less precise than by using
polyhedra, but we will obtain a more eﬃcient analysis.
Let us brieﬂy recall the main features of some numerical domains already in
the literature.
Intervals. Intervals approximate a set of integers by an interval enclosing all of
them. Formally, a set V ⊆ Z is approximated with [a, b] where a = min V and
b = max V. If it is not possible to know precisely the upper and lower bound of
a set of integers a and b are −∞ and +∞, respectively. This domain is a lattice,
and the ordering operator  is such that [a, b]  [c, d] if and only if the interval
[a, b] is contained by [c, d]. Therefore the top element is the interval [−∞,+∞]
and the bottom element is an interval such that a > b. This lattice has inﬁnite
height and contains inﬁnite ascending chains. So it needs a widening operator.
Intervals scale up, but in some cases they are too rough.
Polyhedra. Convex polyhedra are regions of some n-dimensional space that are
bounded by a ﬁnite set of hyperplanes. A convex polyhedron in Rn describes
a relation between n quantities. P. Cousot and N. Halbwachs [15] applied the
theory of abstract interpretation to the static determination of linear equali-
ties and inequalities among program variables by introducing the use of convex
polyhedra as an abstract domain.
We denote by v = (v0, . . . vn−1) ∈ Rn a n-tuple (vector) of real numbers;
v · w denotes the scalar product of vectors v,w ∈ Rn; the vector 0 ∈ R has
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all components equal to zero. Let x be a n-tuple of distinct variables. Then
β = (a · x  b) denotes a linear constraint, for each vector a ∈ Rn, where
a = 0, b ∈ R and = {=,≥, >}. A linear inequality constraint β deﬁnes an
aﬃne half-space of Rn, denoted by con({β}).
A set P ∈ Rn is a (convex) polyhedron if and only if P can be expressed
as the intersection of a ﬁnite number of aﬃne half-spaces of Rn, i.e., as the
solution of a ﬁnite set of linear inequality constraints. The set of all polyhedra
on the vector space Rn is denoted as Pn. Let 〈Pn,⊆, ∅,Rn,unionmulti,∩〉 be a lattice
of convex polyhedra, where “⊆” is the set-inclusion, the empty set and Rn as
the bottom and top elements, respectively. The binary meet operation returns
the greatest polyhedron smaller than or equal to the two arguments, correspond
to set intersection, and “unionmulti” is the binary join operation and returns the least
polyhedron greater than or equal to the two arguments. This abstract domain
has exponential complexity, and it does not scale up in practice.
For more details about polyhedra, many works in literature deﬁne abstract
domains based on polyhedra as Galois connection [6] and implement this domain
[5,27].
Octagons. A. Mine´ introduced Octagons [35] for static analysis by abstract inter-
pretation. The author extended a former numerical domain based on Diﬀerence-
Bound Matrices [34] and showed practical algorithms to represent and manip-
ulate invariants of the form ±x ± y ≤ c (where x and y are program variables
and c is a real constant) eﬃciently. Such invariants describe sets of point that
are special kind of polyhedra called octagons because they feature at most eight
edges in a two dimensional space.
The set of invariants which the analysis discovers is a subset of the ones
discovered by Polyhedra, but it is quite eﬃcient. In fact, it infers the invariants
with a O(n2) worst case memory complexity per abstract state and a O(n3)
worst case time complexity per abstract operation, where n is the number of
variables in the program.
3.1 The Reduced Product
The best way to combine the propositional formulae domain 〈℘(Σ),,
∅, Σ,unionsq,〉 and a numerical domain 〈ℵ,ℵ,⊥ℵ, ℵ,unionsqℵ,ℵ〉 is by using the
reduced product operator [14].
Let ℘(Σ) −−−→←−−−γ0
α0
℘(Σ) and ℘(Σ) −−−→←−−−γ1
α1 ℵ be two Galois connections and
let  : ℘(Σ) × ℵ → ℘(Σ) × ℵ be a reduce operator deﬁned as follows: let
X ∈ ℘(Σ) be a set of partial traces, and N ∈ ℵ an element of the numerical
domain (a set of intervals, an octagon or a polyhedron). Notice that whatever
domain you choose, N can be seen as a set of relations among variables value.
The reduce operator  is deﬁned as (〈X,N〉) = 〈X′,N〉 where
X′ ={σnew | ∀σ ∈ X.l(σnew) = l(σ)
∧ r(σnew) = (r(σ)  {x → y | y = z ∈ N, z ∈ V ∪ Z ∧ z = x})}
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Fig. 1. Reduced product example
The reduced operator is aimed at excluding pointless dependencies for all vari-
ables which have the same value during the execution, without loosing purpose-
ful relations (by the condition “x = z”). The reduce operator removes from the
propositional formulae, contained in X, the implications which have at the right
side a variable that has a constant value. In fact if the variable has a constant
value, it cannot depend on other variables.
Then, the reduced product D	 is deﬁned as follows:
D	 = {(〈X,N〉) | X ∈ ℘(Σ),N ∈ ℵ}
Consider X0,X1 ∈ ℘(Σ),N0,N1 ∈ ℵ and 〈X0,N0〉, 〈X1,N1〉 ∈ D	. Then
〈X0,N0〉 	 〈X1,N1〉 if and only if X0  X1 and N0 ℵ N1. We deﬁne the
least upper bound and greatest lower bound operator by 〈X0,N0〉 unionsq	 〈X1,N1〉 =
〈X0unionsqX1,N0unionsqℵN1〉 and 〈X0,N0〉	〈X1,N1〉 = 〈X0	X1,N0ℵN1〉, respectively.
〈D	,	, ∅, (〈Σ,Rn〉),unionsq	,	〉 forms a complete lattice. In order to better under-
stand the improvements yielded by the combination of the two domains consider
the following example.
Example 2. Consider the code we introduced in Fig. 1. We adopt polyhedra as
numerical domain. Below we report the results of two analyses for some program
points.
Polyhedra
4 n = 0;x − 1 = 0; i = 0; y = 0
5 −p + sum = 0; y = 0;x − 1 = 0;−i + n ≥ 0; 3i − n ≥ 0;
8 −p + sum = 0; y = 0;x − 1 = 0;−i + n ≥ 0;−i + k ≥ 0; 3i − n ≥ 0;
10 −p + sum = 0; y = 0;x − 1 = 0;−i + n ≥ 0;−i + k ≥ 0; 3i − n ≥ 0;
12 −p + sum = 0; y = 0;x − 1 = 0;−i + n − 1 ≥ 0;−i + k ≥ 0;
i ≥ 0; 3i − n + 3 ≥ 0;
14 −p + sum = 0; y = 0;x − 1 = 0;−i + n ≥ 0;−i + k − 1 ≥ 0; 3i − n ≥ 0;
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Propositional formula
4 x → y
5 p → sum
8 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (y → sum)
10 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (x → sum)
12 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (x → sum) ∧ (y → sum)
14 (x → y) ∧ (p → sum) ∧ (x → sum) ∧ (y → sum) ∧ (n → sum)∧
(i → sum) ∧ (i → n) ∧ (k → sum) ∧ (k → n)
When we apply the reduce operator deﬁned above we obtain the following propo-
sitional formulas:
4 T
5 p → sum
8 p → sum
10 p → sum
12 p → sum
14 (p → sum) ∧ (i → n) ∧ (k → n)
By using the reduce operator we simpliﬁed the propositional formulas, removing
some implications which could in fact generate false alarms when using the
direct product of the domains instead of the reduced product. For instance, in
Pos analysis we track the relation y → sum. At the same time, in the numerical
analysis, we detect that variable sum is always equal to p (namely it is constant).
This means that y → sum is a false alarm, hence by the reduce product we may
delete it. At the same time, we cannot remove the relation between sum and p
because it is detected also by the numerical analysis.
4 An Extension to Database Query Languages
In this section, we extend the full power of the proposed model to the case of
data-intensive applications embedding SQL statements, in order to identify pos-
sible leakage of sensitive database information as well. This is particular impor-
tant as in fact unauthorized leakage often occurs while propagating through
database applications accessing and processing them legitimately.
4.1 A Motivating Example
Consider the database of Table 12 where customer’s personal information and
journey-details are stored in tables “Customer” and “Travel” respectively. On
booking a particular ﬂight by a customer, the journey details are added to the
table “Travel” and the source-destination distance is added to the corresponding
entry in ‘DistanceCovered’ attribute of the table “Customer”. Observe that 10
points on the journey each 100Km are oﬀered which is reﬂected in the attribute
‘Points’. In addition, a boarding-priority value in the attribute ‘BoardPriority’
is assigned to each journey based on the points acquired by the passenger. This
is depicted by procedure BookFlight() in program P in Fig. 2.
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Table 12. Database dB
(a) Table “Customer”
custID custName Address Age DistanceCovered Points
1 Alberto Athens 56 650 60
2 Matteo Venice 68 49 0
3 Francesco Washington 38 972 90
4 Smith Paris 42 185 10
(b) Table “Travel”
custID Source Destination FlightID JourneyDate BoardPriority
1 A B F139 26-04-14 2
2 C D F28 16-11-13 0
3 A B F139 26-04-14 3
4 A B F139 26-04-14 1
Fig. 2. Program P
Assume that values of the attributes ‘Address’, ‘Age’, ‘DistanceCovered’
and ‘Points’ in table “Customer” are private, whereas the information in Table
“Travel” is public. To distinguish from the database attributes, we preﬁx $ to the
application variables in P. Finally, suppose the company has decided to upgrade
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the customers having more than 50 ‘Points’ to the status of ‘BoardPriority’. This
is expressed in P by the activation of the Upgrade() function.
It is clear from the code that the values of ‘BoardPriority’ in tuples where
‘custID’ are equal to ‘1’ and ‘3’ will be upgraded from 2 to 3 and from 3 and 7
respectively. Therefore, an attacker can easily deduce the exact values of sensitive
attribute ‘Points’ in Table “Customer”, by observing the change that occurred
in the public attribute ‘BoardPriority’ in Table “Travel”.
The example above clearly shows that sensitive database information may
be leaked through database applications when public attribute values depend,
directly or indirectly, on private attribute values or private application variable
values in the program. For instance, in the given example, the leakage occurs
due to the dependence “Points→ BoardPriority” at program label 19.
4.2 Labeled Syntax and Concrete Semantics
The labeled syntax description of the language, depicted in Table 13, includes
imperative statements embedding SQL. We express an SQL statement by a tuple
〈OP, φ〉, where φ is a precondition following ﬁrst-order logic which is used to iden-
tify a set of tuples in the database on which the appropriate operation OP (either
select, or insert, or update, or delete) is performed. Each operation represents
a set of actions, e.g. select operation includes GROUP BY, aggregate functions,
ORDER BY, etc. Observe that applications embedding SQL statements involve
two distinct sets of variables: application variables Va and database variables
Vd. Variables from Vd appear only in the SQL statements, whereas variables in
Va may appear in all types of instructions (either SQL or imperative).
We deﬁne the action function a and variable function V for the language in
Tables 14 and 15 respectively.
Lets recall from [23] the notion of environments correspond to the variables
in Va and Vd respectively.
An application environment ρa ∈ Ea maps a variable x ∈ dom(ρa) ⊆ Va to
its value ρa(x). So, Ea  Va −→ D where D is the semantic domain for Va.
Consider a database as a set of indexed tables {ti | i ∈ Ix} for a given set of
indexes Ix. A database environment is deﬁned by a function ρd whose domain is
Ix, such that for i ∈ Ix, ρd(i) = ti.
Given a database environment ρd and a table t ∈ d. Assume attr(t) =
{a1, a2, ..., ak}. So, t ⊆ D1 × D2 × .... × Dk where ai is the attribute corre-
sponding to the typed domain Di. A table environment ρt for a table t is deﬁned
as a function such that for any attribute ai ∈ attr(t), ρt(ai) = 〈πi(lj) | lj ∈ t〉,
where π is the projection operator and πi(lj) represents ith element of the lj-th
row. In other words, ρt maps ai to the ordered set of values over the rows of the
table t.
A state σ ∈ Σ  L × Ed × Ea is denoted by a tuple 〈, ρd, ρa〉 where  ∈ L,
ρd ∈ Ed and ρa ∈ Ea are the label of the statement to be executed, the database
environment and the application environment respectively.
The set of states of a program P is, thus, deﬁned as Σ[[P]]  L[[P]]×Ed[[P]]×
Ea[[P]], where L[[P]] is the set of labels in P, and Ed[[P]] and Ea[[P]] are the sets
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Table 13. Syntax of labeled programs embedding SQL
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Table 14. Deﬁnition of action function a
Table 15. Deﬁnition of variables function V
of database and application environments whose domain is the set of database
and application variables in P only.
The labeled transition relation T : Σ ×A −→ ℘(Σ) speciﬁes which successor
states σ′ = 〈′, ρd′ , ρa′〉 ∈ Σ can follow when an action a ∈ A executes on
state σ = 〈, ρd, ρa〉 ∈ Σ. We denote a labeled transition by σ a−→ σ′ or by
〈, ρd, ρa〉 a−→ 〈′, ρd′ , ρa′〉, or by 〈, ρ〉 a−→ 〈′, ρ′〉 where ρ and ρ′ represent (ρd, ρa)
and (ρd′ , ρa′) respectively.
The labeled transition semantics T[[P]] ∈ ℘(Σ[[P]] × a[[P]] −→ ℘(Σ[[P]])) of a
program P restricts the transition relation to program actions, i.e.
T[[P]]σ = {σ′ | σ a−→ σ′ ∧ a ∈ a[[P]] ∧ σ, σ′ ∈ Σ[[P]]}
The labeled transition semantics of various commands in database applica-
tions can easily be deﬁned from the semantic description reported in [23].
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Given a program P, let I = {〈in[[P]], ρd, ρa〉 | ρa ∈ Ea ∧ ρd ∈ Ed} be the set
of initial states of P. The partial trace semantics of P can be deﬁned as
T[[P]](I) = lfp⊆∅ F (I) =
⋃
i≤ω
F i(I)
where F (I0) = λX. I0 ∪
{
σ0
a0−→ . . . an−1−−−→ σn an−→ σn+1 | σ0 a0−→ . . . an−1−−−→ σn ∈ X
∧σn an−→ σn+1 ∈ T[[P]]
}
4.3 Abstract Semantics
In case of applications embedding SQL statements, we need to consider two addi-
tional dependences, called database-database dependence and program-database
dependence [24]. A program-database dependence arises between a database vari-
able and an application variable, where values of the database variable depend
on the value of the program variable or vice-versa. A database-database depen-
dence arises between two database variables where the values of one depend on
the values of the other.
Example 3. Consider the database of Table 12 in Sect. 4.1. Consider the following
SELECT query:
q1 = SELECT Points, AVG(Age) INTO va FROM Customer WHERE Points >=50
GROUP BY Points HAVING SUM(DistanceCovered)>100 ORDER BY Points
Note that we use “INTO va” in q1 to mention that the result of the query is ﬁnally
assigned to va, where va is a Record or ResultSet type application variable with
ﬁelds w = 〈w1, w2〉. The type of w1, w2 are same as the return type of ‘Points’,
‘AVG(Age)’ respectively. Recall from Table 13 that the syntax of SELECT state-
ment is deﬁned as:
〈5assign(va), 4f(exp′), 3e(h(u)), 2φ′, 1g(exp), 0φ〉
According the syntax deﬁned above, q1 can be formulated as:
q1 = SELECT e(h(u)) INTO va(w ) FROM Customer WHERE φ GROUP BY(exp) HAVING
φ′ ORDER BY ASC(exp′)
where
– φ = Points >=50
– exp = 〈Points〉
– g(exp) = GROUP BY(〈Points〉)
– φ′ = (SUM◦ALL(DistanceCovered))>100
– h = 〈DISTINCT, AVG◦ALL〉
u = 〈Points, Age〉
h(u) = 〈DISTINCT(Points), AVG◦ALL(Age)〉
– exp′ = 〈Points〉
– f(exp′) = ORDER BY ASC(〈Points〉)
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– va = Record or ResultSet type application variable with ﬁelds w=〈w1, w2〉.
The type of w1 and w2 are same as the return type of DISTINCT(Points) and
AVG◦ALL(Age) respectively.
From q1 we get the following set of logical formula representing variable depen-
dences:
Points → va.w1, Age → va.w2, Points → va.w2
DistanceCovered → va.w1, DistanceCovered → va.w2
Below we depict variable dependences in other SQL commands.
q2=UPDATE Customer SET DistanceCovered = $y + 150 WHERE custID=2
/* where $y is an application variable. */
The logical formula obtained from q2 are: custID → DistanceCovered, $y →
DistanceCovered.
q3 = INSERT INTO Travel(custID,Source,Destination,FlightID,
JourneyDate,BoardPriority) VALUES (5,“D”,“E”,“F34”, $y, $z)
/* where $y and $z are application variables. */
The logical formula obtained from q3 are: $y → JourneyDate, $z →
BoardPriority.
q4 = DELETE FROM Customer WHERE Age >60
The logical formula obtained from q4 are:
Age → custID, Age → custName, Age → Address
Age → Age, Age → DistanceCovered, Age → Points
The dependences above indicate explicit-ﬂow of information. An example of
implicit-ﬂow that may occur in case of our application is, for instance, when
manipulation of any public database information is performed under the control
statements involving high variables.
Table 16 depicts abstract labeled transition semantics of various statements in
database applications. The abstract semantics of the program is obtained by
ﬁx-point computation over the abstract domain.
4.4 Enhancing the Analysis
The dependences that we considered so far are syntax-based, and may yield false
positives in the analysis. For instance, let us consider the database in Table 17
and the query q5.
q5 = SELECT Type INTO va FROM Emp, Job WHERE Sal = BASIC+(BASIC ∗
(DA/100))+(BASIC ∗ (HRA/100))
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Table 16. Deﬁnition of abstract transition function T
Table 17. Database dB
The following logical formulae representing PD-dependences exist in q5:
ψ5= Sal → va.w1, BASIC → va.w1, DA → va.w1, HRA → va.w1,
Type → va.w1
Assuming ‘Sal’, ‘BASIC’, ‘HRA’, ‘DA’ are private and at least one employee in
each job-type must exist, we see that although syntactic PD-dependences above
indicating the presence of information leakage, but in practice nothing about
these secrets is leaked through va.w1.
Here is an another example of PD-dependence that is indicating false alarm
on leakage: consider the code {$x = 4 ∗ $w ∗ log 2; UPDATE t SET a = a + $x;}.
Assuming $x is private and $w, a are public, we see that the dependence $x → a
generates false alarm as because $x is always equal to 0.
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Table 18. Database dB
To remove all such false alarms and to increase the accuracy of the anal-
ysis, we analyze programs by using the semantic-based abstract interpretation
framework.
Consider an abstract domain ℵ where numerical attributes and numerical
application variables are abstracted by the domain of intervals4. The abstrac-
tion yields an abstract query q6 corresponding to q6 and an abstract database
depicted in Table 18.
q6
 = SELECT Type INTO va FROM Emp,
Job WHERE Sal = BASIC+(BASIC ∗
(DA/[100, 100]))+(BASIC ∗ (HRA/[100, 100]))
The right-hand side expression of the condition in WHERE is evaluated to abstract
values [936, 1480], [1638, 2000], and [2255, 2542] respectively corresponding to the
three abstract tuples in “Job”. Observe that, according to the assumption that
at least one employee must exist in each job-type, there exist at least one ‘Sal’
in “Emp” for which “Sal = [936, 1480]” is true, according to the following:
[li, hi] =
 [lj , hj ] 
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
true if (li ≥ lj ∧ hi ≤ hj)
false if hi < lj ∨ li > hj
 otherwise
Similar for “Sal = [1638, 2000]” and “Sal = [2255, 2542]”. Therefore, the
evaluation of q6 on dB always gives the same result w.r.t. the property ℵ, irre-
spective of the states of “Emp”.
We can perform similar analysis of the code {$x = 4 ∗ $w ∗ log 2; UPDATE t
SET a = a + $x;} in the domain of intervals, yielding to “no update” of the values
in public attribute a.
The interaction of the logical and numerical domains can be formalized by
using the reduced Product D	 as follows:
D	 = {(〈X,N〉) | X ∈ ℘(Σ),N ∈ ℵ}
where (〈X,N〉) = {〈i, ψk〉 | 〈i, ψj〉 ∈ X ∧ ψk = (ψj  {v1 → v2 | y ∈ γ(N)})
}
.
In the example above, by analyzing q6 in the abstract domain ℵ where numer-
ical variables are abstracted by the domain of intervals, we see that the value
of va.w1 generated by q6 is always constant throughout the program execution
4 For other type of variables, the abstraction function represents identity function.
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w.r.t. ℵ. As ψ6 ∈ Pos and va.w1 ∈ ℵ, the reduced product operator  removes
from ψ6 all dependences in the form “x → va.w1” (that are representing false
alarms), and makes the analysis more accurate and eﬃcient.
5 Implementing the Analysis in Sails
In this section, we present Sails. The tool is an instance of the generic analyzer
Sample. This is why we discuss the main issues we have to solve in order to deal
with information leakage analysis within Sample.
5.1 Sample
Sample (Static Analyzer of Multiple Programming LanguagEs) is a generic ana-
lyzer based on the abstract interpretation theory. Relying on compositional anal-
yses, Sample can be plugged with diﬀerent heap abstractions, approximations of
other semantic information (e.g., numeric domains or information ﬂow), prop-
erties of interest, and languages. Several heap analyses, semantic and numerical
domains have been already plugged. The analyzer works on an intermediate lan-
guage called Simple. Up to now, Sample supports the compilation of Scala and
Java bytecode to Simple.
Figure 3 depicts the overall structure of Sample. Source code programs are
compiled to Simple. A ﬁxpoint engine receives a heap analysis, a semantic
domain, and a control ﬂow graph (whose blocks are composed by a sequence
of Simple statements), and it produces an abstract result over the control ﬂow
graph of each method. This result is passed to a property checker that produces
some output (e.g., warnings) to the user. The integration of an analysis in Sample
allows one to take advantage of all aspects not strictly related to the analysis
but that can improve its ﬁnal precision (e.g., heap or numerical abstractions).
For instance, Sample is interfaced with the Apron library [28] and contains a
heap analysis based of TVLA [39].
5.2 Heap Abstraction
In Sample heap locations are approximated by abstract heap identiﬁers. While
the identiﬁers of program variables are ﬁxed and represent exactly one con-
crete variable, the abstract heap identiﬁers may represent several concrete heap
locations (e.g., if they summarize a potentially unbounded list), and they can
be merged and split during the analysis. In particular we have to support (i)
assignments on summary heap identiﬁers, and (ii) renaming of identiﬁers.
In order to preserve the soundness of Sails, we have to perform weak assign-
ments on summary heap identiﬁers. Since a summary abstract identiﬁer may rep-
resent several concrete heap locations and only one of them would be assigned in
one particular execution, we have to take the upper bound between the assigned
value, and the old one.
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Fig. 3. The structure of Sample
The heap abstraction could require to rename, summarize or split exist-
ing identiﬁers. This information is passed through a replacement function
rep : ℘(Id) → ℘(Id), where Id is the set containing all heap identiﬁers. For
instance, in TVLA two abstract nodes represented by identiﬁers a1 and a2 may
be merged to a summary node a3, or a summary abstract node b1 may be splitted
to b2 and b3. Our heap analysis will pass {a1, a2} → {a3} and {b1} → {b2, b3}
to Sails in these cases, respectively. Given a single replacement S1 → S2, Sails
removes all subformulae dealing with some of the variables in S1, and for each
removed subformula s it inserts a new subformula s′ renaming each of the vari-
ables in S1 to each of the variables in S2. Formally:
rename : (Pos × (℘(Id) → ℘(Id))) → Pos
rename(σ, rep) = {(i′1, i′2) : (i1, i2) ∈ σ∧
i′1 =
{
i1 if R1 ∈ dom(rep) : i1 ∈ R1
k1 if ∃R1 ∈ dom(rep) : i1 ∈ R1 ∧ k1 ∈ rep(R1) ,
i′2 =
{
i2 if R2 ∈ dom(rep) : i2 ∈ R2
k2 if ∃R2 ∈ dom(rep) : i2 ∈ R2 ∧ k2 ∈ rep(R2) }
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5.3 Propositional Formulae
We have to introduce some slight modiﬁcations on the domain for information
leakage analysis described in Sect. 2 to work with object oriented languages. We
can consider a propositional formula φ as a conjunction of subformulae (ζ0 ∧
. . . ∧ ζn). In the implementation, each subformula is an implication between
two identiﬁers. Then we represent a subformula as a pair of identiﬁers and a
formula as a set of subformulae. Consider the statement if(x > 0) y = z;. The
formula obtained after the analysis of this statement is represented by the set
{(y, z), (x, y)}, where we denote the identiﬁer of the variable u by u¯. The order
relation “” is deﬁned by the subset relation (φ0  φ1 ⇔ φ0 ⊆ φ1).
Consequently, in the implementation the set of propositional variables V consists
in the set of identiﬁer Id, a single propositional formula is represented by ℘(Id×
Id) and an abstract state σ ∈ Σ is a conjunction of propositional formulae
represented by ℘(℘(Id × Id)).
5.4 Implicit Flow Detection
An implicit information ﬂow occurs when there is an information leakage from
a variable in a condition to a variable assigned inside a block dependent on that
condition. For instance, in if(x > 0) y = z; there is an explicit ﬂow from z to y,
and an implicit ﬂow from x to y. To record these relations we relate the variables
in the conditions to the variables that have been assigned in the block. When
we join two blocks coming from the same condition, we discharge all implicit
ﬂows on the abstract state. Observe that Sails does not support all cfgs that can
be represented in Sample but only the ones coming from structured programs,
i.e., that corresponds to programs with if and while statements and not with
arbitrary jumps like goto.
5.5 Property
An information ﬂow analysis can be carried out by considering diﬀerent attacker
abilities. We implemented two scenarios: when the attacker can read public vari-
ables only at the beginning and at the end of the computation, and when the
attacker can read public variables after each step of the computation5. Moreover,
we implemented two security properties for each attacker: secrecy (i.e., informa-
tion leakage analysis) and integrity.
The veriﬁcation of these properties happens after the computation of the
analysis and the declaration of private variables (at run time, by a text ﬁles
writing the variables name or by a graphical user interface selecting the vari-
ables in a list).
5 Notice that, as in [47], we assume that the attacker, in both cases, knows the source
code of the program.
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5.6 Numerical Analysis
The information ﬂow analysis is based on the reduced product of a dependency
and a numerical analysis. Thanks to the compositional structure of Sample, we
can plug Sails with diﬀerent numerical domains. In particular, Sample supports
the Apron library. In this way, we can combine Sails with all numerical domains
contained in Apron (namely, Polka, the Parma Polyhedra Library, Octagons,
and a deep implementation of Intervals).
In addition, we can apply diﬀerent heap abstractions. For instance, if we are
not interested to the heap structure, we can use a less accurate domain that
approximates all heap locations with one unique summary node, as we will do
in Sect. 6.2.
5.7 Complexity of the Analysis
The complexity of variables dependency analysis showed in Sect. 2 is strictly
correlated to the complexity of propositional formulae. Logical domains, in lit-
erature, are widely treated and generally, the logical equivalence of two boolean
expression is a co-NP-complete problem. However, this complexity issue may
not matter much in practice because the size of the set of variables appearing
in the program is reasonably small. Hence, on the one hand, work with proposi-
tional formulae requires the solving of a co-NP-complete problem, while on the
other hand, in many frameworks (included our system), Pos only deal with the
variables appearing in the programs, reducing in this way the complexity. Gen-
erally, it is possible to increase the eﬃciency of the computation using the binary
decision diagrams (BDDs) for the implementation of propositional formulae. For
more information about binary decision diagrams see [1].
The simpliﬁcation adopted in the implementation, i.e. the deﬁnition of “”
by the subset relation (φ0 φ1 ⇔ φ0 ⊆ φ1), permits to decrease the complexity.
In fact, decreasing the precision of the analysis, we can compare two propositional
formulae in polynomial time.
About polyhedra analysis, the complexity is well and completely treated in
many works [5] and heavily depends on its implementation. For example many
implementations, e.g. Polylib and New Polka, use matrices of coeﬃcients, that
cannot grow dynamically, and the worst case space complexity of the methods
employed is exponential. In PPL library, instead, all data structures are fully
dynamic and automatically expanded (in amortized constant time) ensuring the
best use of available memory. Comparing the eﬃciency of polyhedra libraries is
not a simple task, because the pay-oﬀ depends on the targeted applications: in
[5] the authors presented many test results about it.
The complexity of reduced product, and more precisely of reduction operator
presented in Sect. 3.1, is strictly connected with the complexity of the operations
on the domains we combine.
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6 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the experimental results of Sails. First of all, we
present the results in terms of precision when we analyze a case study involving
recursive data structures. Then, we present the results obtained when applying
Sails to the SecuriBench-micro suite.
6.1 Case Study
Consider the Java code in Fig. 4. Class ListWorkers models a list of workers of an
enterprise. Each node contains the salary earned by the worker, and some other
data (e.g., name and surname of the person). Method updateSalaries is deﬁned
as well. It receives a list of employees and a list of managers. These two lists
are supposed to be disjoint. First method updateSalaries computes the maximal
salary of an employee. Then it traverses the list of managers updating their
salary to the maximal salary of employees if manager’s salary is less than that.
Usually managers would not like to leak information about their salary to
employees (secrecy property). This property could be expressed in Sails spec-
ifying that we do not want to have a ﬂow of information from managers to
employees. More precisely, we want to prove the absence of information leakage
from the content of ﬁeld salary of any node reachable from managers to any node
reachable from employees.
Fig. 4. A motivating example
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Fig. 5. The initial state of the heap abstraction
We combine Sails with a heap analysis that approximates all objects cre-
ated by a program point with a single abstract node [20]. We start the anal-
ysis of method updateSalaries with an abstract heap in which lists managers
and employees are abstracted with a summary node and they are disjoint.
Figure 5 depicts the initial state, where n2 and n4 contains the salary values of
the ListWorkers n1 and n3, respectively. In the graphic representation we adopt
dotted circles to represent summary nodes, rectangles to represent local vari-
ables, and edges between nodes to represent what is pointed by local variables
or ﬁelds of objects. Note that the structure of these two lists does not change
during the analysis of the program, since method updateSalaries does not modify
the heap structure.
Sails infers that, after the ﬁrst while loop at line 15, there is a ﬂow of infor-
mation from n2 to maxSalary. This happens because variable it points to n1
before the loop (because of the assignment at line 9), and it iterates following
ﬁeld next (obtaining always the summary node n1) perhaps assigning the con-
tent of it.salary (that is, node n2) to maxSalary. Therefore, at line 15 we have the
propositional formula n2 → maxSalary.
Then updateSalaries traverses the managers list. For each node, it could assign
maxSalary to it.salary. Similarly to what happened in the previous loop, variable
it points to n3 before and inside the loop, since ﬁeld next always points to the
summary node n3. Therefore the assignment at line 18 could potentially aﬀects
only node n4. For this reason, Sails discovers a ﬂow of information from maxSalary
to n4, represented by the propositional formula maxSalary → n4.
At the end of the analysis, Sails soundly computes that (n2 → maxSalary) ∧
(maxSalary → n4). By the transitive property, we know that there could be a
ﬂow of information from n2 to n4, that is, from employees to managers. This ﬂow
is allowed by our security policy. On the other hand, we also discovered that
there is no information leakage from list managers to list employees, since Sails
does not contain any propositional formula with this ﬂow. Therefore Sails proves
that this program is safe.
“Noninterference of programs essentially means that a variable of conﬁdential
(high) input does not cause a variation of public (low) output” [38]. Thanks to
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the combination between a heap abstraction and an abstract domain tracking
information ﬂow, Sails deals directly with the structure of the heap, extending the
concept of noninterference from variables to portions of the heap represented by
abstract nodes. This opens a new scenario since we can prove that a whole data
structure does not interfere with another one, as we have done in this example.
As far as we know, Sails is the only tool that performs a noninterference analysis
over a heap abstraction, and therefore it can prove properties like “there is
no information ﬂow from the nodes reachable from v1 to the nodes reachable
from v2”.
6.2 Benchmarks
A well-established way of studying the precision and the eﬃciency of informa-
tion ﬂow analyses is the SecuriBench-micro suite [45]. We applied Sails to this
test suite; the description and the results of these benchmarks are reported in
Table 19. Column fa reports if the analysis did not produce any false alarm.
We combined Sails with a really rough heap abstraction that approximates all
Table 19. SecuriBench-micro suite
Name Description fa
Aliasing1 Simple aliasing ✓
Aliasing2 Aliasing false positive ✓
Basic1 Very simple XSS ✓
Basic2 XSS combined with a conditional ✓
Basic3 Simple derived integer test ✓
Basic5 Test of derived integer ✓
Basic6 Complex test of derived integer ✓
Basic8 Test of complex conditionals ✓
Basic9 Chains of value assignments ✓
Basic10 Chains of value assignments ✓
Basic11 A simple false positive ✓
Basic12 A simple conditional ✓
Basic18 Protect agains simple loop unrolling ✓
Basic28 Complicated control ﬂow ✓
Pred1 Simple if(false) test ✗
Pred2 Simple correlated tests ✓
Pred3 Simple correlated tests ✓
Pred4 Test with an integer variable ✓
Pred5 Test with a complex conditional ✓
Pred6 Test with addition ✗
Pred7 Test with multiple variables ✗
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Table 20. Jif case studies
Name Description fa
A Simple explicit ﬂow test ✓
Account Simple explicit ﬂow test ✓
ConditionalLeak Explicit ﬂow in if statement ✓
Do Implicit ﬂow in the loop ✓
Do2 Implicit ﬂow if and loop ✓
Do3 Implicit ﬂow loop and if ✓
Do4 Implicit ﬂow loop and if ✓
Do5 Implicit ﬂow loop and if ✓
If1 Simple implicit ﬂow ✓
Implicit Simple implicit ﬂow ✓
concrete heap locations with one abstract node. Sails detected all information
leakages in all tests, but in three cases (Pred1, Pred6 and Pred7) it produced
false alarms. This happens because Sails abstracts away the information pro-
duced when testing to true or false boolean conditions in if or while statements.
Since these benchmarks cover only problems with explicit ﬂows, we performed
further experiments using some Jif [36] case studies. The results are reported in
Table 20: we discovered all ﬂows without producing any false alarm.
These results allow us to conclude that Sails is precise, since in 90% of the
cases (28 out of 31 programs) it does not produce any false alarm.
About the performances, the analysis of all case studies takes 1.092 s (0.035 s
per method in average) without combining it with a numerical domain. When we
combine it with Intervals it takes 3.015 s, whereas it takes 6.130 s in combination
with Polka. All tests are performed using a MacBook Pro Intel Core 2 Duo 2.53
GHz with 4 GB of RAM memory. Therefore the experimental results underline
the eﬃciency of Sails as well.
7 Related Work
In a security-typed language Volpano et al. [46] were the ﬁrst ones to develop
a type system to enforce information ﬂow policies, where a type is inductively
associated at compile-time with program statements in such a way that well-
typed programs satisfy the non-interference property. The authors formulated
the certiﬁcation conditions of Denning’s analysis [18] as a simple type system
for a deterministic language: basically, a formal system of type inference rules
for making judgments about programs. More generally, type-based approaches
are designed such that well-typed programs do not leak secrets. A type is induc-
tively associated at compile-time with program statements in such a way that any
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statement showing a potential low disclosing secrets is rejected. Type systems
that enforce secure information ﬂow have been designed for various languages
and they have been used in diﬀerent applications. Some of these approaches are,
for example, applied to speciﬁc programs, e.g., written in VHDL [44], where the
analysis of information ﬂow is closely related to the context. Moreover, the secure
information ﬂow problem was also handled in diﬀerent situation, for example
with multi-threaded programs [42] or with programs that employ explicit cryp-
tographic operations [3,21].
A diﬀerent approach is the use of standard control ﬂow analysis to detect
information leakage, e.g., [9,29,30]. The idea, of this technique, is to conser-
vatively ﬁnd the program paths through which data may ﬂow. Generally, the
data ﬂow analysis approach to secure information ﬂow as a translation from a
given program that captures and facilitates reasoning about the possible ﬂows.
For example, Leino and Joshi [29] showed an application based on semantics,
deriving a ﬁrst-order predicate whose validity implies that an attacker cannot
deduce any secure information from observing the public inputs, outputs and
termination behavior of the program.
The use of abstract interpretation in language-based security is not new, even
though there aren’t many works that use the lattice of abstract interpretations
for evaluating the security of programs (for example [49]).
Probably, the main work about information ﬂow analysis by abstract inter-
pretation was done by Giacobazzi and Mastroeni [22] that generalizes the notion
of non-interference making it parametric relatively to what an attacker can
observe, and using it to model attackers as abstractions. A program seman-
tics was characterized as an abstract interpretation of its maximal trace seman-
tics in the corresponding transition system. The authors gave a method for
checking abstract non-interference and they proved that checking abstract non-
interference is a standard static program analysis problem. This method allows
both to compare attackers and program secrecy by comparing the corresponding
abstractions in the lattice of abstract interpretations, and to design automatic
program certiﬁcation tools for language-based security.
There are not so many implementations of secure information ﬂow. In early
2000, some works began the control of sensitive information in realistic languages
[7,37]. Jif [4] and Flow CAML [40] are, as far as we know, the two main imple-
mentations about information ﬂow analysis. Notice that, in the last years other
language-based tools are developed for some speciﬁc language, e.g., Fabric [32]
for distributed computing, the LIO library in haskell [43] and FlowFox [16] a
tool for JavaScript.
According to [41], it seems be helpful to distinguish between two diﬀerent
application scenarios: developing secure software and stopping malicious soft-
ware. The ﬁrst scenario is based on to secure information ﬂow analysis to help
the development of software that satisﬁes some security properties. In this case,
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the analysis serves as a program development tool. The static analysis tool would
alert the programmer to potential leaks and the developer could rewriting the
code as necessary. An example of this scenario can be found in [4], where Askarov
and Sabelfeld discusses the implementation of a “mental poker” protocol in Jif.
The second scenario, instead, the secure information ﬂow analysis is used as a
kind of ﬁlter to stop malicious software. In this case, we might imagine analyzing
a piece of untrusted code before executing it, with the goal of guaranteeing its
safety. This is much more challenging than ﬁrst scenario: probably we would
not have access to the source code and we would need to analyze the binary
code. Analyzing binaries is more diﬃcult than analyzing source code and has
not received much attention in the literature (a Java bytecodes analysis is per-
formed, for instance, by Barthe and Rezk in [8]).
Given this overall context, the approach adopted in Sails is quite diﬀerent
from existing tools that deal with information ﬂow analysis. Jif, for example,
is a security-typed programming language that extends Java with support for
information ﬂow and access control, enforced at compile time and it is an ad
hoc analysis that requires to annotate the code with some type information. If
on the one hand Jif is more eﬃcient than Sails, on the other hand Sails does
not require any manual annotation, and it takes all advantages of compositional
analyzers (e.g., we can combine Sails with a TVLA-based heap abstraction).
Our approach does not require to change the programming language, since it
infers the ﬂow of information directly on the original program, and it asks what
are the private data that have not to be leaked to the user during the analysis
execution.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we presented an information ﬂow analysis through abstract inter-
pretation based on a new domain that combines a variable dependency analysis
and a numerical domain. We then introduced Sails that applies and implements
this analysis on object-oriented programs. Sails is an extension of Sample, there-
fore it is modular with respect to the heap abstraction, and it can verify nonin-
terference over recursive data structures using simple and eﬃcient heap analyses.
The experimental results underline the eﬀectiveness of the analysis, since Sails
is in position to analyze several benchmarks in few milliseconds per program
without producing false alarms in more than 90% of the programs. Moreover,
our tool does not require to modify the original language, since it works with
mainstream languages like Java, and it does not require any manual annotation.
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